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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

11 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: All NFAC Employees

Today, the Director of Central Intelligence has established the National Foreign Assessment Center, which brings together the members of the National Intelligence Staff and the Directorate of Intelligence. Attached is a short paper which explains the purposes of NFAC, how it will operate, and the roles of various officers and components under the new arrangement.

The primary objective of the new organization is to produce the best possible intelligence. Success depends on the contribution of each of you. We count on your cooperation and assure you of our support.

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Robert R. Bowie
Director

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Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director

Attachment

National Foreign Assessment Center

In his recent Directive the President reaffirmed the DCI's "full responsibility for production of national intelligence in appropriate consultation with departmental analytic centers." National intelligence is in effect that intelligence which the President and the National Security Council expect the DCI to provide, from the fully coordinated National Intelligence Estimate to the short, informal memorandum prepared by a single production office, from the product of extended research to immediate current intelligence.

To facilitate the meeting of these responsibilities, the NIO and DDI organizations are being merged into a new National Foreign Assessment Center. This new structure is intended to remove organizational barriers which have artificially segmented the process of producing national intelligence. It will provide for the same degree of Community participation as in the past, but will recognize as well the national importance of much of the Center's own product. It also establishes a foundation upon which new efforts to improve the quality of our finished product can build.

The merger has some well defined purposes:

- To consolidate analytical resources to cope with the full range of production responsibilities including those involving coordinated national intelligence.
- To allow for the development of a program of national intelligence analysis and production that will result in the most effective -- and least disruptive -- use of our limited analytical resources.
- To provide the basis for a concerted effort to improve the national intelligence product and the analytical capabilities of the combined NIO and DDI organizations.
- To establish mechanisms to ensure the introduction of skills and knowledge outside the Intelligence Community into the intelligence production process.

- To improve and toughen the critical review of key intelligence products.
- To maintain developed procedures for producing coordinated national intelligence and for fostering the interdisciplinary treatment of key intelligence problems.

Achieving these purposes will require that we adopt some new operating styles, procedures and organizational mechanisms. The new organization should:

- Achieve genuine integration of the functions of the two groups.
- Allow concentration on substantive matters at the highest levels of the organization.
- Enable upper management to work directly with the analysts in dealing with specific intelligence problems.
- Give high priority to the formulation and implementation of a program of production and research which reduces competitive demands on analysis in favor of its programmed allocation.
- Ensure that the Community voice is preserved in National Intelligence Estimates -- our most important product -- while not overemphasizing the distinction between "Community" and "Agency" national intelligence products.
- And above all else, develop an ubiquitous concern for the excellence of our product.

Procedures will be developed and organizational changes made where they are required to achieve the objectives of the consolidation and the style of operation sought. An early task will be the development of procedures that will ensure:

- Program formulation and oversight with the full participation of those involved in directing the research and analysis from both the disciplinary and issue-oriented points of view.
- A critical review from outset through completion of major intelligence products that incorporates perspectives drawn from outside the Intelligence Community.

- A systematic program to enhance the analytical capabilities available for the production of national intelligence.
- The maintenance of close relations with those collection, processing, and R&D elements of the Community on which our analytical activities rely.

The only major organizational changes now contemplated are the merger of the Offices of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence and of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and of the National Intelligence Officers with the Center for Policy Support. These changes will result in a single front office supported by a single substantive staff for the entire organization.

The leadership of the Center will consist of a Director, a Deputy Director and two Associate Directors. They will function as the central management team responsible for the formulation and supervision of the substantive production programs of the Center. An approximate distribution of responsibilities among these four positions is as follows:

- The Director will be responsible for the full range of Center's activities, but his principal activity will be to serve as the principal substantive alter ego to the DCI. In this capacity, he will give special attention to improving the quality of National Intelligence Estimates and other papers prepared for the senior policy community. He will work directly with the senior officers and analysts engaged in the process of preparing these papers. He will also have immediately available to him the services of a Review Panel and outside experts for substantive review and critique of major production efforts.

- The Deputies. In addition to their joint responsibilities to support the Director in his production management and substantive responsibilities, each of the Deputies will have specified primary responsibilities to execute in behalf of the Director. They will all participate with the Director in a Production Board responsible for the formulation and oversight of the production program.

- The Deputy Director will serve as the principal Deputy to the Director and as his alter ego. In addition to this responsibility, his major concern will be the day-to-day management

and direction of the substantive research program, giving special attention to the development and strengthening of the analytical skills available for the production of national intelligence.

- The Associate Director for Management will, in addition to his substantive responsibilities as member of the Production Board, be the principal officer responsible for resource management and administration within the Center.

- The Associate Director for Substantive Support will be the principal officer responsible for directing the provision of short term substantive papers, presidential and congressional briefings, and the production of current intelligence. One objective is to assure the high quality of current intelligence while ensuring that its demands do not interfere unduly with those activities directed toward longer term, more deeply analytical production.

- The National Intelligence Officers, in addition to their current functions, will assume those formerly carried out by the Center for Policy Support, and serve the Director as staff for the Center as a whole. They will report directly to the Director for substantive guidance and direction. Each NIO will have the following responsibilities within his field:

- Maintenance of close liaison with policy officers and other principal users.
- Coordination and supervision of Community-wide national intelligence production programs, with emphasis on National Intelligence Estimates.
- Coordination and monitoring of interoffice or interdisciplinary intelligence programs.
- In conjunction with the production office directors, developing, monitoring and advising the Director on the production program.
- Serving as senior staff officers to the DCI and the Director in such capacities as they may direct, and especially as the DCI's representatives in the Policy Review process.

- The Office Directors will continue to be responsible for the management of their respective offices and for the quality of their products. They will give particular attention to developing and improving analytical capabilities and to the formulation for the Production Board programs of research and analysis within their substantive domains that anticipate and are responsive to the needs of the policy community. They will participate in all Production Board deliberations affecting their offices.

In addition to these organizational accommodations to the consolidation, two new bodies will be established in pursuit of its principal objectives:

- A Review Panel will consist of a small group of generalists, mainly recruited from outside and serving full-time; they will be attached immediately to the Office of the Director to provide him with an independent review of major intelligence production. There will also be a number of more specialized part-time consultants, who will supplement the Review Panel as needed. Production office directors and National Intelligence Officers may be called on to serve as members of review panels. The Review Panel will be served by the existing staff of the DDI Coordinator for Academic Relations, which will function as its Secretariat.

- A Production Board will be the principal mechanism for shaping the focus and content of the integrated intelligence production program. It will function as a collective body to advise the Director on all aspects of intelligence production and research. It will be chaired by the Director and its membership will include the Deputy and Associate Directors, production office Directors, and National Intelligence Officers. The Board will, from time to time in the interest of efficiency, establish Panels to work up programs and perform other appropriate functions. The Production Board will be served by a Secretary responsible for overseeing the process of program formulation and monitoring its implementation.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Charter for the New CIA

President Carter is now putting finishing touches on an executive order designed at last to charter a future course for the beleaguered Central Intelligence Agency and end its vulnerability as Congress's favorite whipping post.

But the four-year victimization of the CIA has left deep wounds that the President's new charter can do little to cure. Indeed, even as Carter prepares to sign—perhaps this week—the executive order restyling the CIA, Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA director and principal draftsman of the executive order, continues to alarm professional intelligence officers with sometimes heavy-handed internal reforms.

Chief of these is Turner's plan to fire some 800 senior intelligence officers out of a total 4,500, which he privately announced to top CIA staffers last month without elaboration or explanation. To some intelligence experts, both in the United States and among allied nations, the firings between now and Oct. 1, 1978, will create a pool of virtually unemployable, middle-aged intelligence agents, some of whom might be ripe for going public with intelligence secrets (as many other ex-CIA agents have recently done)—or even for recruitment by the Soviet KGB.

A remarkably similar situation occurred following the bloody, post-Stalin political upheaval in the KGB in 1953, which produced an invaluable intelligence haul for the United States. This was directly traceable to a sense of betrayal among ousted KGB agents.

The Carter-Turner CIA reorganization has been drafted with scrupulous attention to legal detail so that the executive order can stand on its own without an immediate new congressional law (which can't be passed until next year). Accordingly, Turner's title will not be elevated to Director of National Intelligence, as originally planned. He remains Director of Central Intelligence with overall supervi-

sion of the government's ramified intelligence units, but with no day-to-day control over the operations of the Pentagon's National Reconnaissance Office, which controls U.S. satellite spies; the National Security Agency, responsible for communications intercepts, among other duties; and the Defense Intelligence Agency, with its Army, Navy and Air Force components.

In return for losing out in the bitterly contested power struggle over direct supervision of these peripheral but vital units, Turner will wield general budget control over all intelligence agencies and will be given new "tasking" powers to decide which one should perform different intelligence-gathering tasks.

In addition to the new National Tasking Center, to be headed by a Turner aide with Turner as chairman of a National Security Council committee with ultimate tasking authority, the executive order will also consolidate all intelligence analysis under Robert Bowie. He will head an office to be called the National Foreign Assessment Center.

Bowie is an experienced expert who headed the State Department's Policy Planning Staff under John Foster Dulles. He was brought into the CIA early this year from Harvard and in his new role must tap assessments and analyses from all intelligence units in the government. Presumably, Bowie will be responsible for the daily intelligence briefing given to the President.

That leaves human (as opposed to scientific) intelligence-gathering and secret or clandestine operations abroad—the source of the CIA's problem with Congress. Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the committee that investigated the CIA in 1975 and 1976, is insisting that the CIA's new charter spell out precise limitations on the CIA's secret operations, including a specific veto on "conspiring to overthrow democratic governments." He wants these prohibi-

tions repeated in the new law, a demand that both mystifies and angers some other senators.

"So we spell out no overthrow of democratic governments," one senator told us. "Does that mean full speed ahead in non-democratic countries?"

The President's executive order is expected to define broad procedures governing CIA dirty tricks, leaving specific prohibitions to congressional oversight committees, which must be informed on all clandestine operations.

Experienced intelligence men, however, fear that the question of foreign operations may be moot in Turner's CIA, no matter what the new charter says. "He's a nut on the scientific gimmicks," one told us, "but doesn't put much stock in human-source intelligence or dirty tricks."

If so, the new CIA will start out hobbled in the always dangerous competition with the far-flung KGB.

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